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petercher kens: Re 702145, my recommendation had -dNOSAFER option, but the user omitted it.14:46.21 
kens Hmm well I missed seeing it. Admittedly I was only scanniong it this morning14:46.46 
  Yes I see you had it in there14:47.19 
  Not the smartest of users I'm afraid14:47.27 
  I should probably add a commetn pointing out that using -dNOSAFER isn't a good idea14:48.06 
petercher I think -dNOSAFWR is fine for this case. The PostScript program is safe, and PDF is not a programming language.14:52.29 
kens But the Ghostscript PDF interpreter is currently a PostScript program14:52.57 
  If you can persuade that to execute random code in a PDF file, then potentially you could unleash remote code execution14:54.12 
  You can't easily do that with a PostScript Form XObject any more, but I wouldn't like to bet that you couldn't start executing a PostScript stream, or a PDF stream which actually contains PostScript.14:55.21 
petercher Yex, Type 1 fonts can execute arbitrary PostScript. Perhaps gs needs a restricted execution operator for this case.15:01.36 
kens I think there are more serious possibilities; I suspect I could create a stream in a PDF file which contained PostScript, and get the GS PDF interpreter to execute it. Obviously a 'normal' PDF interpreter would reject the contents as garbage.15:02.50 
  Which is why we chose to restrict the file operations15:03.16 
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